The Referendum Will Not Bring an End to the UK’s Debate on the EU by Cram, Laura
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Referendum Will Not Bring an End to the UK’s Debate on the
EU
Citation for published version:
Cram, L, The Referendum Will Not Bring an End to the UK’s Debate on the EU, 2016, Web publication/site,
European Futures, Edinburgh.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publisher Rights Statement:
© 2016 Laura Cram. Published under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International) License
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
  
European Futures | Article No 116                                                                         Page 1 of 3 
Article No 116  
 
 
The Referendum Will Not Bring an End to the UK’s 
Debate on the EU 
 
Author(s): Laura Cram 
 
Permalink: http://www.europeanfutures.ed.ac.uk/article-3442 
 
Publication: 21 June 2016 
 
Article text: 
 
The Prime Minister’s renegotiation of the UK’s EU membership is largely judged by 
whether people already support remaining in or leaving the EU, writes Laura Cram. 
Outlining the key components of the settlement, she argues that it has had a 
minimal impact in the campaign, and that the referendum will only reflect a 
moment in public opinion, whereas the issues at stake are of a much broader 
nature.  
 
A ‘New Settlement’ between the UK and the EU was agreed at a meeting of the 
European Council in February. This settlement forms the basis on which the UK 
public will vote on the future of the UK’s membership of the EU next week. The 
settlement addressed four issues: economic governance, competitiveness, 
sovereignty and immigration. 
 
The various Remain and Leave campaigns have interpreted the new settlement 
through the lenses we might expect. For many of those in support of the UK 
remaining a member of the EU, the settlement resulting from David Cameron’s 
renegotiations has resulted in a legally binding ‘special status’ that allows for a 
renewed and protected position for the UK in the EU, consonant with current UK 
Government priorities. 
 
For those in favour of the UK’s exit from the EU, the special status is unconvincing, 
representing a temporary compromise unlikely to be sustainable as the European 
integration process continues to move ahead and presents new challenges to the 
UK’s ability to control its own affairs. 
 
An additional voice is emerging from those who broadly favour UK membership of 
the EU but feel that the renegotiations, focused on competition, deregulation and 
benefit restrictions for migrants, have moved the EU further away from the type of 
union of which they want to be part. 
 
It is certainly the case that the binary in/out nature of the referendum and the 
renegotiations, conducted as they were only on the present UK Government’s 
priorities, have left little room for reflection about the nature of the EU. 
 
So, What Was Agreed? 
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In terms of economic governance, the settlement provides a two-way commitment. 
On the one hand, it guarantees that, as a non-Eurozone country, the UK (and other 
non-Eurozone countries) cannot be discriminated against or excluded from 
important decision processes. Nor can these countries be expected to face financial 
penalties related to Eurozone ‘bail-outs’. On the other hand, these non-Eurozone 
countries may not impede further progress in the Eurozone. The position of the 
Bank of England as supervisor of financial stability in the UK is assured. 
 
In addition, the commitment of the EU and its Member States to enhance 
competitiveness and to complete the Single Market is reiterated. Specifically, a 
commitment to decreasing the regulatory burden and compliance costs for 
businesses and to repealing any unnecessary legislation is made. 
 
The EU commits to pursue an active and ambitious trade policy. An annual review of 
the existing body of EU legislation is to take place, with an eye to concerns for 
subsidiarity (that decisions are taken at the lowest possible level) and 
proportionality (that interventions are limited to the extent that they are strictly 
required). National parliaments and stakeholders will be involved in this process. 
 
Thirdly, in the area of sovereignty, the commitment to ‘ever-closer union’ will not 
include the UK and may not be allowed to justify moves toward further political 
integration in the EU. The existing UK arrangements to opt out or to opt in to EU 
level measures in the areas of policing, immigration and asylum continue to stand. 
 
National security remains the responsibility only of the UK Government. A so-called 
‘red card’ procedure will be introduced. This will allow national parliaments to halt 
discussion of EU legislative proposals in the Council if the principle of subsidiarity is 
believed by 55 per cent of national parliaments to have been breached. 
 
Finally, on the issue of immigration, the settlement addresses issues of access to 
free movement, particularly prevention of abuse or fraud and the assessment of 
potential threat. In relation to social benefits, an ‘emergency brake’, allowing 
limitation of full access to in-work benefits for new EU workers, may be instituted 
in cases in which a Member State is experiencing an ‘exceptional situation’ (at 
present, this includes the UK). Member States may also index child benefits to the 
circumstances of the country to which they are being exported. 
 
Despite these agreements, the question of what type of EU people in the UK as a 
whole or in its constituent territories want, or do not want, to be part of has not 
seriously been addressed in this process. In practice, the renegotiations will have 
little impact on the vote. 
 
Indeed, the details of the package are already largely forgotten and the wider 
debate swiftly moved on to broader geopolitical security issues that did not feature 
significantly in the renegotiations, and to the usual campaign hyperbole, threat and 
counter threat, from both camps. The renegotiation package and the new 
settlement were, however, essential to allowing David Cameron to campaign for the 
UK to stay in the EU. 
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The referendum is unlikely to be the end of the issue, regardless of the outcome. 
The UK’s relationship with the EU has not been properly debated and will not be 
resolved by a referendum. Both the UK and the EU are constantly changing, while a 
referendum will provide a snapshot of public opinion – a static image unsuited to 
capturing two moving targets. Indeed, the repercussions of the referendum may 
further exacerbate shifts in internal relationships within the UK and at EU level. 
 
This article, co-published with the Centre on Constitutional Change, draws from the 
e-book Britain’s Decision – Facts and Impartial Analysis for the EU Referendum. 
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